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C ~ n ~ t i t ~ t i ~Law-DEFAMATION-THE
nal
SUPREMECOURT
PLACES
FURTHER
LIMITATIONS
ON DESIGNATION
AS A "PUBLIC
FIGURE" IN LIBEL
ACTIONS-Wok ton v. Reader's Digest Association,
443 U.S. 147 (1979).
During 1957 and 1958, a special federal grand jury subpoenaed Ilya Wolston to testify concerning Soviet espionage activity
in the United States. On July 1, 1958, Wolston failed to appear
to testify before the grand jury as subpoenaed. Wolston subsequently agreed to plead guilty to a criminal contempt charge
and received a one-year suspended sentence. During the sixweek interval between Wolston's failure to appear before the
grand jury and his sentencing, fifteen newspaper stories concerning his alleged espionage appeared in New York and Washington, D.C.' Although Wolston was never indicted for espionage,
he was identified as a Soviet agent in a book published in 195ga
and in an FBI report entitled "Expos6 of Soviet Espionage, May
1960."9
Following the publication in January 1974 of a book entitled
KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents (KGB),' Wolston sued
the book's author, John Barron, and it's publishers for libel.'
The book detailed Soviet espionage activity in the United States
after World War I1 and identified Wolston as a Soviet agent? In
addition, Wolston claimed that a passage in the book falsely
stated that he had been indicted for espionage.'
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the author's and publishers' motions for summary
judgmentas The district court concluded that Wolston was a
"public figure" for the "limited purpose of comment on his connection with, or involvement in, espionage in the 1940's and
1. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 163 (1979).
(1959).
2. B. MORROS,
MY TENYEARSAS A COUNTERSPY
3. S. Doc. No. 114, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
4. J. BARRON,
KGB: THESECRET
WORKOF SOVIET
AGENTS(1974).
5. Reader's Digest Association was the initial publisher and Bantam Books, MacMillan Book Clubs, and Book-of-the-Month Club were subsequent publishers. 443 U.S.
at 159 & n.1.
6. Id. at 159.
7. Id. at 159-60.
1977), aff'd,
8. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 180-81 (D.D.C.
578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), reu'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).

4501

CASENOTES

451

1950'~."~
As a result, the New York Times standard of proof applied,1° and Wolston was required to prove that the alleged defamatory passages were published with "actual malice."ll The
district court found that the allegedly libelous passages in KGB
were ambiguous and that Wolston had failed to demonstrate any
actual malice.12 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit afErmed.13
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the D.C. Circuit," concluding that the two lower courts had incorrectly classified Wolston as a "limited-issue" public figure.15 The Court
reasoned that Wolston had not " 'voluntarily thrust' or 'injected'
himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding
the investigation of Soviet espionage in the United States" in
order to influence public opinion.le Wolston was therefore a private figure and not required to prove the existence of actual
malice in order to recover.17

A determination of the standard of liability to apply in a
defamation action requires a court to balance the state's interest
in protecting the reptitation of private citizens and the publisher's first amendment rights. The Supreme Court has struggled to reconcile these two competing values18 in a series of cases
from which varying constitutional standards concerning defama9. Id. at 176.
10. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),established that plaintiffs
who are determined to be "public officials" must prove that the defamation was made
with "actual malice." Id. at 283-86.Later Court decisions extended the New York Times
standard to include "public figures." See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130
(1967).
11. 429 F. Supp. at 179."Actual malice" is defined as "actual knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth." Id. a t 172.
12. Id. at 180.
13. Wolston v. Reader's Digest M n , 578 F.2d 427,435 (D.C.Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443
U.S. 157 (1979).The D.C. Circuit determined that Wolston qualified as a public figure
because of his conviction for criminal contempt. The court stated, "In short, by his voluntary action he invited attention and comment in connection with the public questions
involved in the investigation of espionage." Id. at 431.
14. 443 US. 157 (1979).
15. See note 39 infra.
16. 443 U.S. at 166.
17. 443 U.S. at 161. The Court disposed of the case under the public figure issue
and, as a consequence, did not review the propriety of summary judgment on the issue of
whether respondents had published the alleged defamation with actual malice.
18. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,325 (1974).

,
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tion of public figures have evolved.lQAnalysis of the Supreme
Court's determination that the New York Times standard of
proof regarding public figures would not apply in Wolston's case
requires an understanding of the evolution of the New York
Times standard.
A. Defamation and Public Figure Status
In 1964 the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. SullivanM established the "actual malice" standard as a prerequisite
for liability for defamation of a public official. The case involved
a political advertisement in the New York Times criticizing the
manner in which police in Montgomery, Alabama handled civil
rights demonstrations by black students. Sullivan, one of three
elected commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama,
brought a libel action against the paper under Alabama libel law
and was awarded a $500,000 judgment. The Court reversed the
judgment after declaring Alabama's law "constitutionally deficient" in establishing truth as the sole defense for defamatory
p ~ b l i c a t i o n The
. ~ ~ Court held that "a rule compelling [a publisher] to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertion^"^^ deterred criticism of official conduct and therefore violated the
first and fourteenth amendments."' In response, the Court formulated the actual malice standard, which provided a privilege
applicable in a libel action for criticism of public officials. The
actual malice standard "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it is false or with
19. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U S . 295 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401
U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U S . 727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v.
Hanks, 389 U S . 81 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 US. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. h u i siana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964). See
generally Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61
MINN.
L. REV.645, 650 n.25 (1977).
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. Id. at 264, 279.
22. Id. at 279.
23. Id. at 264, 279.
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reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.""
Three years later, in Associated Press v. Walker and Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts,a6the Supreme Court extended the New
York Times standard to include "public figures" as well as public officials. Curtis involved a Saturday Evening Post story
claiming that Butts, the athletic director at the University of
Georgia, had conspired to fix a college football game.26 Walker
involved an erroneous Associated Press dispatch describing former Major General Edwin Walker's participation in an attempt
to block the desegregation of the University of Mississippi. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni association and because Walker had resigned from the Army, neither man could be
classified as a public official for purposes of the New York Times
standard. Nevertheless, the concurring opinion by Chief Justice
Warren stated that individuals like Butts and Curtis, though not
public officials, may be "intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape
events in areas of concern to society at large";27 therefore, the
New York Times standard should also apply to them.
In Rosenbloom u. Metromedia,
the plurality opinionn
extended the New York Times standard to defamation actions
involving private individuals if the defamation concerned matters of "public or general interest."" Rosenbloom involved a nudist magazine distributor allegedly defamed during a radio
broadcast. The Court decided the distinction between public officials or public figures and private individuals in the application
of the New York Times standard was untenable because the focus was on "the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior
anonymity or n~toriety."~~
If the matter was one of "public or
the status of the participant or the voluntary
general intere~t,"~'
24. Id. at 279-80.
25. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (the two cases were consolidated on certiorari).
26. Graham, The Story of a College Football Fix, SAT.EVE.POST,Mar. 23, 1963, at
80.
27. 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
28. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
29. Rosenbloom represented the Supreme Court at its most fragmented point in the
development of a defamation privilege. Of the eight justices participating, five wrote
opinions. Id. at 30.
30. 403 U.S. at 43-44.
31. Id. at 43.
32. Id. at 44.
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nature of his actions should not determine whether the New
York Times standard applied." As a result, the Court in Rosenbloom extended the New York Times standard to include private individuals involved in events of public or general interest
and required proof of actual malice in order to recover damages.
Concluding that the balance between reputational interest
and first amendment freedoms had tipped too far toward the
first amendment at the expense of the states' legitimate interests
in protecting private citizens from defamation, the Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc? rejected the Rosenbloom "public
interest" test, which had permitted application of the New York
Times standard to defamation of private citizens. Elmer Gertz, a
prominent Chicago attorney, had been characterized in a John
Birch Society publication as a "Leninist" and a "Communistfronter" with a lengthy criminal record." Mr. Gertz sued the
publisher, who attempted to invoke the New York Times standard as a defense, alleging that Gertz satisfied the Rosenbloom
public interest test by acting as counsel in a controversial lawsuit. In rejecting this argument, the Court relied primarily on
the reasoning set forth in Justice Harlan's dissent in Rosenbloom.MThe Court recognized two reasons for extending the actual malice standard to public figures. First, the Court recognized that public figures have greater access to the media in
order to rebut defamation." Second, and of greater importance,
the Court determined that public figures are less deserving of
judicial protection since they, like public officials, have usually
"voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehood concerning them."s8
The Court in Gertz identified two ways in which an individual might attain the stature of a public figure, thereby invoking
application of the New York Times standard:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
33. Id. at 43.
34. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
35. Id. at 326.
36. 403 U.S. at 70-71.
37. 418 U.S. at 344.
38. Id. at 345.
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range of issues. In either case such persons assume special
prominence in the resolution of public questions.3*

The Court concluded that absent either of these conditions the
individual remains a private figure and that the states may allow
recovery under any standard short of liability without fault.'O
Two years later in Time, Inc. u. Firestone," the Court affirmed the Gertz decision. Mrs. Firestone was a Florida socialite
involved in a widely publicized divorce case. Time magazine's
alleged libel was a report of the trial court's final judgment asserting that the "extramarital escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr.
Freud's hair ~ u r l . " ~ Vholding
n
Mrs. Firestone to be a private
figure, the Court emphasized the fact that she had not "thrust
herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in
order to influence the resolution of the issues invol~ed."~~
The
Court noted that a private divorce, even one generating sensational publicity, did not meet the requirement of a "public controversy" as defined by Gertz."

B. Lower Courts' Post-Firestone Determination of Public
Figure Status
Between Firestone and Wolston, nine of the eleven federal
courts of appeals considered cases involving determinations of
public figure status in libel actions. In the ten cases involved,
only one plaintiff, well-known political columnist and commentator William F. Buckley, was determined to be a "public figure
for all purposes and in the classic sense."4s Seven of the decisions determined that the plaintiffs met the "limited-issue" public figure definition as enunciated in Gertz and interpreted in
39. Id. at 351. The Court in Gertz provided two somewhat varying definitions of a
public figure. The narrower definition of a public figure-later adopted by the Court in
Firestone and Wokton--defines a public figure as follows: "Some occupy positions of
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.
More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront
of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. a t 345.
40. Id. at 347 & n.lO.
41. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
42. Id. at 450.
43. Id. at 453.
44. Id. at 454. The Court declined to "equate 'public controversy' with all controversies of interest to the public." Id.
45. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Firestone. In the remaining two cases the courts determined
that the plaintiffs were private figures and, accordingly, that the
New York Times standard did not apply?
Of the seven plaintiffs held to be limited-issue public figures
two were so designated because they conceded public figure status under the facts in their cases. In Appleyard u. Transameri' Fourth Circuit held that a truckdriver incan Press, I ~ c . , ~the
volved in a test case with the Interstate Commerce Commission
over unauthorized truckloads48was a public figure by virtue of
his acceptance of public figure status: "Appleyard concedes that
he was a public figure at the time that the alleged libel took
place."4e Similarly, the Third Circuit in Dickey u. CBS Inc."
found a member of a Republican board of supervisors to be a
public figure because he "admitted to being a public fig~re."~'
46. Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977); Ryder v. Time, Inc.,
557 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In a Time magazine article detailing abuse of public trust
by attorneys, the plaintiff in Ryder, Richard J. Ryder, had been mistakenly identified as
another Virginia attorney, Richard R. Ryder. The latter had been suspended from the
practice of law for eighteen months for concealing stolen cash and a sawed-off shotgun in
his safety deposit box. Although the plaintiff, Richard J. Ryder, was politically active in
his community and was a former state legislator, the D.C. Circuit determined that "these
public activities had nothing to do with the reference to Richard Ryder in the [Time]
essay and, in any case, those activities were no longer engaged in by plaintiff." 557 F.2d
a t 826. The court placed the "public activities of an individual in one sphere, and his
private status in another." Id. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff was clearly a
private individual for the issues raised by the Time article.
In Dixson, the plaintiff had been a vice president of Frontier Airlines while the company was suffering severe financial losses. After replacing several of its executives (including the plaintiff) with new management in 1971, Frontier Airlines made a financial
recovery that was the subject of a Newsweek article in 1972. The Tenth Circuit decided
that although "the subject of the Newsweek article was of some public interest," the
"plaintiff Dixson was neither a public official nor a public figure" for purposes of the
New York Times standard. 562 F.2d a t 628.
47. 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976).
48. Appleyard had agreed with the editor of Overdrive magazine to drive an unauthorized truckload from Winston-Salem, North Carolina, to the Interstate Commerce
Commission in Washington, D.C. Their purpose was to force a test case upon the ICC,
with Overdrive agreeing to fund any litigation costs Appleyard might incur. After a dispute over financing the suit, Appleyard established his own legal defense fund independent of Overdrive's efforts. Overdrive subsequently published two articles falsely suggesting that Appleyard had illegally diverted moneys from Overdrive's legal defense fund
for the personal use of Appleyard and his associates. Id. at 1028.
49. Id. a t 1029.
50. 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978). Dickey was a member of the Delaware County
Republican Board of Supervisors. This position was not an elected public office but simply part of the local Republican party machinery. Following the board's decision not to
endorse a local Congressman for reelection, the Congressman on a television talk show
accused Dickey of accepting a bribe while serving as a board member. Id. at 1222 & n.2.
51. Id. a t 1227.
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The appellant was therefore subject to the New York Times
standard.
The remaining five plaintiffs were held to be limited-issue
public figures as a matter of law?' The Third Circuit in Chuy u.
Philadelphia Eagles Football Clubm determined that a firststring professional football player involved in a well-publicized
contractual dispute with one National Football League team and
trade to another National Football League team was a limitedissue public figure, "at least with respect to his ability to play
f o ~ t b a l l . "The
~ Third Circuit reasoned that professional athletes "generally assume a position of public prominence" during
their active playing careersMand that their contractual disputes
are of great interest to sports fans. Chuy's contract dispute and
trade was highly publicized and therefore "no mere private contractual matter."*
In Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.," Playboy magazine had characterized the plaintiff as a "mobster" after media
reports of his association with organized crime figures. The Fifth
Circuit found Rosanova to be a public figure with respect to
commentary on his association with organized crime: "The nature of his reported associations and activities concerning organ52. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). In Rosenblatt, the Supreme Court
indicated that determination of public official (and by inference, public figure) status is
to be decided as a question of law. The Court stated that "as is the case with questions
of privilege generally, it is for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether
the proofs show respondent to be a 'public official.' " Id. at 88. Accord, Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1326 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd,579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
53. 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979). But see 46 TJZNN.
L. REV.252 (1978).
In spite of its ostensible recognition that public-figure status is controversyrelated, the appeals court failed to apply this standard to plaintiff, thus avoiding the Gertz-Firestone test, which would have prevented plaintiffs classification as a public figure since he clearly had not entered a public controversy in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
Id. at 265.
54. 595 F.2d at 1280.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Third Circuit distinguished Chuy from Firestone as follows:
We believe that Chuy's public prominence was a good deal more marked
than the status of the plaintiff in [Firestone].The former Mrs. Firestone was
found not to have attained a role of prominence in affairs of society and her
divorce action was deemed not a public controversy. Although the marital
troubles of the wealthy do not make them public figures, a professional athlete's contractual troubles relating to his playing performance commands the
attention of a more sustained and wider public audience.
Id. at 1280 n.21 (citations omitted).
57. 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ized crime are, without dispute, subjects of legitimate public
c o n ~ e r n . "Morever,
~
the Fifth Circuit rejected Rosanova's contention that public figure status should be withheld since he had
not sought media attention. The court held that designation as a
public figure does not and must not depend on the desires or
choice of any putative public figure? In this regard, the Fifth
Circuit stated:
It is no answer to the assertion that one is a public figure to
say, truthfully, that one doesn't choose to be. It is sufficient, as
the district court found, that "Mr. Rosanova voluntarily engaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and
c~mment."~

In Orr v. Argus-Press Co.P1 an attorney had been indicted
for violating Michigan State securities laws through his involvement in an abortive shopping mall development. The Sixth Circuit held that he was a " 'public figure' for the limited purpose
of reporting on his arrest and indictment and the circumstances
~~
surrounding the collapse of his shopping mall p r ~ p o s a l . "The
Sixth Circuit interpreted Gertz and Firestone to allow classification of a criminal defendant as a limited-issue public figure
provided
[hlis conduct in the community is a legitimate matter of public
interest, the press has publicized his conduct in part as a result
of his own efforts to obtain publicity, and his conduct has
made him the target of a criminal proceeding about which the
public has a need for information and interpretati~n.~~
58. Id. at 861. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Rosanova from Firestone by interpreting the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone to suggest that Mrs. Firestone failed to
become a public figure because the subject matter of the case, her divorce and the attendant publicity, were "activities of an essentially private nature in which the public
has no, or at moat marginal, legitimate interest." Id. at 861 n.3.
59. The Fifth Circuit stated:
[Tlhe status of public figure uel non does not depend upon the desires of an
individual. The purpose served by limited protection to the publisher of comment upon a public figure would often be frustrated if the subject of the publication could choose whether or not he would be a public figure. Comment upon
people and activities of legitimate public concern often illuminates that which
yearns for shadow.
Id. at 861.
60. Id. at 861 (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440,445
(1976)).
61. !B6 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978).
62. Id. at 1116.
63. Id. The Sixth Circuit stated that the facts in Orr illustrated the need for the
public figure privilege in libel cases. The publicity in the case arose when Michigan
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In Hutchinson v. Proxmireja the Seventh Circuit analyzed
the libel claim of a research scientist who was the recipient of a
"Golden Fleece Award" as a result of his expenditures of public
funds for research on primate emotional behavior-why "rats,
monkeys, and humans bite and clench their jaws.'"' The scientist brought an action against Senator William Proxmire, who
had awarded the Golden Fleece Award. The Seventh Circuit determined that Dr. Hutchinson was "a public figure with regard
to the propriety of his re~earch."~~
The Court found persuasive
the fact that Dr. Hutchinson had "actively solicited federal
grants to pursue his research and had secured a substantial
amount of public funds by his application^."^^ In addition, Dr.
Hutchinson had published many articles regarding his research,
and local papers had printed stories publicizing his research. Finally, he had enjoyed access to the media to rebut any alleged
defamation resulting from a report of the Golden Fleece
Award?
In Arnheiter v. Random House, I ~ C .the
, ~Ninth
~
Circuit
held that a former naval officer, who had been relieved of command of a U.S. Navy warship for cause, qualified as both a pubbrought criminal charges against Orr for securities fraud. The court found that the publicity the press provided serves an important public function "in our system of criminal
justice because it informs the public about the law, warns the public of harm and serves
to deter law violations. The press functions in such cases as one of the sanctions in our
system." Id. at 1117. Given the fact that few reporters are lawyers, that they work under
short deadlines, and that they have difficulty summarizing complex legal arguments in a
few paragraphs, "the public importance of reporting on cases of this kind" demands that
the law allow them "some leeway for misinterpretation and error." Id. at 1117.
64. 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
65. Id. at 1036.
66. Id. at 1035. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), the Supreme Court
overturned the Seventh Circuit's holding that Dr. Hutchinson qualified as a limited-purpose public figure. See note 115 infra.
67. 579 F.2d at 1034.
68. Id. at 1035. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Firestone on the basis of the
plaintiffs status, i.e., the voluntary nature of Dr. Hutchinson's actions. The court stated:
[Firestone], cited by plaintiff, is factually distinct from the ,present case.
There, the Court found that Mrs.Firestone .was not a public figure since she
did not thrust herself into the forefront of a public controversy in order to
influence its resolution by her divorce proceedings and related press conferences. In contrast, here Dr. Hutchinson was not forced to seek public funds
and plaintiffs numerous articles and news stories which preceded his rebuttal
press release demonstrate his public affirmation of the soundness of the research and the continued public funding thereof.
Id. at 1035 n.14 (citations omitted).
69. 578 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1978).
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lic official and public figure.1° The court distinguished
Arnheiter's case from Firestone by stating that in contrast to
Mrs. Firestone's divorce
Arnheiter's removal from command of a war vessel implicated
criticd-isms of public concern, i.e., military decision-making
in the conduct of war,and the selection of those entrusted with
our national defense. Arnheiter did much more than seek reversal of his removal. He used every conceivable effort to gain
public exposure and to make his case a "cause celbbre." He
successfully courted massive publicity and eventually pressured one congressman to hold a series of ad hoc hearings on
the subject of his removal.'l

As demonstrated by the foregoing cases, the federal courts
of appeals have applied the public figure requirements enunciated in Gertz and Firestone with widely varying results.12 These
cases illustrate the difficulty in making the inherently subjective
determinations of who is a "public figure" and what is a "public
controversy" as required by Gertz and Fire~tone.~"

In Wokton, the Supreme Court found Wolston to be clearly
not an "all-purpose" public figure,'4 i.e., one who occupied a po~~
to make
sition of "persuasive power and i n f l ~ e n c e "sdlicient
him a public figure for all issues. Moreover, the Court held that
Wolston was not a "limited-purpose" public figure in the context
of commentary about his connection with Soviet espionage in
the 1940's and 1 9 5 0 ' ~ . ~ ~
The Court determined that neither Wolston's criminal contempt conviction for failure to appear before a federal grand
70. Id. at 805.
71. Id.
72. Lower courts have arrived at similarly varying results in determination of public
figure status in libel actions. See R WINFIELD,
LIBELLITIGATION
66-75 (1979).
73. In Rosanoua u. Ployboy Enterprises, Inc., the Fifth Circuit illustrated the difficulty of determining public figure statw. ''Defining public figures is much like trying to
nail a jellyfish to the wall." 580 F.2d at 861 n.2 (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D.Ga 1978)). The court observed that the public
figure category, while eluding "a truly working definition, . . . falls within that class of
legal abstractions where 'I know it when I see it,' in Mr. Justice Stewart's words." Id. at
861 (citations omitted).
74. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 165.
75. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345.
76. 443 US. at 166.
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jury investigating Soviet espionage nor the resultant publicity
was s s c i e n t to make him a limited-purpose public figure?
Wolston had not "voluntarily thrust" or "injected" himself into
the forefront of any Soviet espionage controversy in ah attempt
to influence public opinion on the issues invol~ed.?~
Although Wolston's failure to appear in response to a subpoena during the heat of the investigation may have been newsworthy, media attention alone is not conclusive of status as a
public figure." The Court stated, "A libel defendant must show
more than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding burden of New York Timedwo
The Court reemphasized the need for lower courts to look at
the " 'nature and extent of an individual's participation in the
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation' " in order
to determine public figure status.81 In analyzing Wolston's contempt conviction, the Court felt his failure to respond to the
grand jury's subpoena was "in no way calculated to draw attention to himself in order to invite public comment or influence
the public with respect to any i s ~ u e . "The
~ Court determined
that petitioner's failure to respond was the result of ill health
and that the contempt citation was not intended to be used as a
"fulcrum to create public discussion" about the espionage investigation?' Finally, the Court concluded that criminal conduct
alone does not automatically render the individual a public
figure for comment on the limited range of issues relating to his
convi~tion.~
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed that Wolston was not a "public figure" in
1974.86According to Justice Blackmun, the sixteen-year lapse of
timeW between Wolston's contempt conviction and alleged de77. "We decline to hold that [Wolston's] mere citation for contempt rendered him a
public figure for purposes of comment on the investigation of Soviet espionage." Id. at
167.
78. Id. at 166.
79. Id. at 167.
80. Id. at 167-68.
81. Id. at 167 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 352).
82. Id. at 168.
83. Id.
84. Id. Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[tlo hold otherwise would create an 'open
season' for all who sought to defame persons convicted of a crime." Id. at 169.
85. 443 U.S. at 169-70.
86. The majority chose not to consider whether a lapse of time may dissipate
whatever public figure status may be applicable to a plaintiff involved in a public contro-
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famatory publication was sufficient to erase whatever "public
figure" distinction Wolston may have had in 1958.87Because the
Gertz rationale for public figure status-access to the media and
assumption of public scrutiny-varies with the passage of time,
Justice Blackmun theorized that a person "may be a public
figure for purposes of contemporaneous reporting of a controversial event, yet not be a public figure for purposes of historical
commentary on the same occ~rrence."~~
In his dissent, Justice Brennan concluded that Wolston
qualified as a "limited-issue" public figure in 1974. Justice Brennan found the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit persuasive: "The issue of Soviet espionage in 1958 and of Wolston's involvement in
that operation continues to be a legitimate topic of debate today, for that matter concerns the security of the United States.
The mere lapse of time is not de~isive."~@
versy at an earlier date. Wolston abandoned the "time lapse" argument in the Supreme
Court since both lower courts had rejected it. See 578 F.2d at 431; 429 F. Supp. at 178.
The Court stated, "Because petitioner does not press the issue in this Court and because
we conclude that petitioner was not a public figure in 1958, we need not and do not
decide whether or when an individual who was once a public figure may lose that status."
443 U.S. at 166 n.7. '
87. 443 U.S. at 171. According to Justice Blackmun, the determination that Wolston
was a private citizen rather than a public figure in 1974 rendered moot the more difficult
question of whether he was a public figure in 1958. Id. at 171-72.
88. Id. at 171. The district court had rejected the distinction Justice Blackmun
made between contemporaneous reporting and historical commentary.
Surely historical comment on the espionage-related activities of Wolston and
others who became involved in the controversy during the 1950's requires just .
as much protection as did media coverage of the events as they occurred. The
Constitution does not confine debate on public issues and the roles of people
involved in them to discrete and brief periods of time. Moreover, the need hurriedly to print "hot news" is but one of the rationales supporting the publicfigure concept. Authors and publishers of books, like their news-media counterparts, are simply unable to guar&tee the truth of each and every word they
print. To be sure, they may well have greater opportunity to investigate the
truth of their assertions, and this might bear on a finding of actual malice. But
to impose on them the burden of acting as would a reasonably prudent person
under the circumstances-under either a'negligence or gross negligence standard-would doubtless lead to destructive self-censorship. For reasonable people might differ about the amount of time, money, and manpower necessary to
complete an adequate investigation, and these differences could become either
the bases for a host of lawsuits or for decisions not to publish. Insofar as public
figures are concerned, the Constitution accords breathing space to publishers
in order to avoid these results and, instead, to encourage publishers not to
refrain from printing criticism unless they know it is false or have serious
doubts about the truth of it.
429 F. Supp. at 178 (footnotes omitted).
89. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d at 431, quoted at 443 U.S. at
(Breman, J., dissenting).

CASENOTES

A. Publishers Required to Determine the Subjective Intent
of Putative Public Figures' Actions
In determining that Wolston's failure to obey a federal
grand jury subpoena was not for the purpose of influencing a
public controversy, the Court made a subjective determination
regarding Wolston's intent. The Court rejected the decisions of
both lower courts that Wolston's contempt conviction was determinative of his public figure status. The Court stated that the
facts of the case did not justify a conclusion that Wolston had
voluntarily thrust or injected himself into any controversy surrounding Soviet espionage in 1958.@O Wolston was characterized
by the Court as having been "dragged unwillingly into the controversy,"@land his failure to appear in response to subpoena
the result of his poor health."@2The Court conwas "simply
cluded there was no evidence that Wolston's contempt conviction was "intended to have, or did in fact have, any effect on any
issue of public concern."sa The clear implication of the Court's
analysis is that a putative public figure must not only act volun-

...

90. 443 U.S. at 166.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 168. In determining that Wolston's primary motivation for failing to appear in response to subpoena was "his poor health," the Court chose to ignore evidence
presented at trial suggesting a different conclusion. Wolston had testified pursuant to
subpoena before the Special Federal Grand Jury for the Southern District of New York
in early 1957. During the 14 months between this initial testimony and his contempt
citation, Wolston had been subpoened five different times and the day before each
scheduled appearance had offered an excuse for failing to appear. The U.S. attorney,
Herbert C. Kantor, submitted an aflidavit in the August 7, 1958, contempt proceeding
stating that
Wolston's actions demonstrate deliberate disregard for the process of this
Court. He has appeared or failed to appear before the Grand Jury according to
his own whim. His refusal to appear before the Grand Jury to give testimony
on July 1, 1958, constitutes a completed criminal contempt. In this case it has
resulted in Wolston's avoiding testifying befoze this Grand Jury. In a last minute effort to avoid the possible punishment for his contemptuous behavior,
Wolston sought to appear before the Grand Jury on the final day of its statutory period. Such an appearance, however, would have been meaningless.
Appendix of Brief for Respondent at 89-90, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 443 U.S.
157 (1979). In addition, according to newspaper stories covering the contempt proceeding, the federal judge who presided said, "[Tlhere is no question in my mind that there
was a studied attempt [by Wolston] to avoid [an] appearance before this grand jury." Id.
at 7 (citations omitted). Presumably, the federal judge determined that Wolston's guilty
plea for criminal contempt of court was made with "actual voluntariness" before accepting it.
93. 443 U.S. at 168.
.
,
a
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tarily but also purposefully, consciously intending to influence
the public with respect to some public controversy.
In Wolston, the Court provided an example illustrating the
requirement of both purposeful and voluntary action aimed at
influencing public opinion. Wolston might have become a limited-issue public figure, the Court implied, had he invited a citation for contempt "in order to use the contempt citation as a
fulcrum to create public discussion about the methods being
Jusused in connection with an investigation or prose~ution."~
tice Blackmun's concurring opiniona6interpreted the majority's
holding as restricting the limited-issue public figure category to
one who "literally or figuratively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate
a particular view."* According to Justice Blackmun, the majority's determination that Wolston failed to act purposefully in
that manner was decisive of his failure to qualify as a limitedissue public figure.@'
By requiring publishers to determine the subjective intent
of a putative public figure's actions, the Court ignored and tacitly overruled its previous holding in Gertz that "the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that . .
public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them."@8As
the district court noted, consideration of a putative public
figure's subjective intent is not relevant if, as Gertz indicated,
the media may assume that the ostensibly voluntary actions of
individuals are actually
Wolston's voluntary guilty
plea to a criminal contempt charge was the objective manifestation of his intent.'" By subjectively analyzing Wolston's motives

.

94. Id.

95. Justice Blackrnun concurred only in result because he felt "no need to adopt so
restrictive a definition of 'public figure' " as the majority had done. Id. at 170.
96. Id. at 169.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345.
99. 429 F. Supp. at 177.
100. The Court's decision in Firestone that Mrs. Firestone failed to qualify as a
public figure rested on two grounds. See, e.g., Arnheiter v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d
804,805 (1978). First, a divorce, even though highly publicized, is "not the sort of 'public
controversy' referred to in Gertz." 424 U.S. at 454. Second, Mrs. Firestone's actions in
obtaining a divorce were not voluntary-she had no alternative but to go to court in
order to obtain a divorce. "Nor did respondent freely choose to publicize issues as to the
propriety of her married life. She was compelled to go to court by the State in order to
obtain legal release from the bonds of matrimony." Id. Unlike Mrs. Firestone, Wolston
had several alternatives to a criminal contempt conviction and the attendant notoriety.
Wolston was not compelled to breach his privacy by complying with the subpoena: grand
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to determine whether or not he was a limited-issue public figure,
the Court added another factor commentators and courts must
consider in determining whether a particular libel plaintiff is a
public figure.
The implications of the Court's requirement of subjective
analysis of a putative public figure's intent are serious. As the
district court noted, first amendment protections and the concept of "breathing space" for the press are incompatible with a
"test that forces the media either to comprehend a person's motives or to refrain from commenting on his actions."lol Because
commentators have "no way of ascertaining with certainty-much less of proving-the actual thought processes of a
. [they] must rely on objective indicia
putative public figure
of his intentions."lo2 In addition, the requirement of subjective
intent precludes application of the limited-issue public figure
category to those individuals who voluntarily participate in a
public controversy without intending to purposefully influence
public opinion.loSThe New York Times rationale-a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and ~ide-open"~~~-seems

..

jury proceedings are theoretically secret, and evidence indicates Wolston apparently received no publicity when he complied with the subpoenas and did testify. Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 177 n.32.
He might instead have chosen to comply with the subpoena or, like respondent
Firestone, to go to court to vindicate whatever right he may have had not to
comply with it. When he failed to choose either of these alternatives, he became involved in a controversy of a decidedly public nature in a way that invited attention and comment, and thereby created in the public an interest in
knowing about his connection with espionage that outweighed his competing
interest in remaining anonymous.
Id. at 177 n.33.
101. 429 F. Supp. at 177 n.33.
102. Id.
103. A person who voluntarily participated in a public controversy without intending to purposefully influence public opinion would be a public figure, according to
the district court, where his
participation might be significant, and the extent substantial, whether or not
he actually craves the public's attention or wields power and influence. Thus,
for example, one individual might seek to remain a recluse, and yet, by virtue
of his power and influence, qualify as a public figure. And by the same token, a
virtual nonentity desiring no attention at all may, by engaging in activity that
appears to affect the public's well-being, qualify as well. In each case the public
has a legitimate interest in knowing about the individual's activities, and he
can be said to have sacrificed a measure of his interest in protecting his
reputation.
Id. at 175.
104. 376 U.S. at 270.
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no less persuasive when applied to an individual whose actions
are "substantial regardless of his intentions."lo6

B. More Restrictive Definition of "Public Controversy"
The second principal criterion in Gertz for qualification as a
The
public figure is involvement in a "public ~ontroversy.'"~~
Gertz Court, however, provided no standard for determining
what is a "public controversy"; it simply found the Rosenbloom
"public interest" test too subjective. The Court in Gertz wished
to relieve judges of the responsibility of deciding "on an ad hoc
basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not-to determine . . 'what information is
relevant to self-government.' "lo7
Firestone provided little additional guidance as to what
constitutes a "public controversy." The Court merely stated that
"[d]issolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not
the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though
the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be
of interest to some portion of the reading public."lo8 As the district court stated:

.

Firestone seems to indicate that matters which are essentially
private, such as issues in a divorce proceeding, do not become
public for purposes of libel law solely because they are aired in
a public forum. Thus, although divorce itself may be an important subject of debate, discussion of the details of particular
divorces generally does little to advance that debate and therefore does not require the degree of insulation from suit accorded by the standard in New York Tirnes.loS

In contrast, Wolston, according to both lower federal courts, involved issues of a decidedly public nature-the investigation of
Soviet espionage in 1958 and Wolston's connection with it. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated,
"The issue of Soviet espionage in 1958 and of Wolston's involvement in that operation continues to be a legitimate topic of debate today, for that matter concerns the security of the United
105. 429 F. Supp. at 177 11.33.
106. Id. at 175.
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 346.
108. 424 U.S. at 454.
109. 429 F. Supp. at 175-76 (footnotes omitted).

4501

CASENOTES

467

States."llo
The Supreme Court only reached the public controversy requirement in Wolston as dictum.ll1 The Court's superficial
treatment of the public controversy issue, however, suggests that
not only must the issues involved be "public," but a legitimate
"controversy" must also exist. The Court observed:
It is difficult to determine with precision the "public controversy" into which petitioner is alleged to have thrust himself. Certainly, there was no public controversy or debate in
1958 about the desirability of permitting Soviet espionage in
the United States; all responsible United States citizens understandably were and are opposed to it.lla .

The implication of the Court's characterization of the issues
involved in Wolston is that a legitimate "public controversy" for
defamation purposes does not arise until segments of society
have "taken sides."11s The Court has in effect resurrected the
Rosenbloom ambiguities of judges' subjective, ad hoc determinations as to whether particular issues are "controversies" consisting of "legitimate" opposition within society. Moreover, by
phrasing the controversy in broad or narrow terms, as illustrated
by the Court's characterization of the issues involved in WoEston, a court may manipulate the "public controversy" test to
reach the desired result.l14
By emphasizing the "controversy" aspect of the public controversy definition, the Court seems to have effectively narrowed
the applicability of the New York Times standard in defamation
cases to those issues that generate "legitimate" opposition
within society as subjectively determined by the court
involved.l15
110. 578 F.2d at 431.
111. The Court stated, "We may accept, arguendo, respondents' characterization of
the 'public controversy' involved in this case, for it is clear that petitioner fails to meet
the other criteria established in Gertz for public figure status." 443 U.S. a t 166 n.8.
112. Id. The public controversies in previous defamation cases might not have qualified as legitimate "public controversies" under the Court's analysis in Wokton. All "responsible United States citizens understandably were and are opposed to" police brutality (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), racial segregation (Associated
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)), "fixed" college football games (Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)), pornography (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29
(1971)), etc.
113. 46 TENN.L. REV.252, 267 (1978).
114. See Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN.L.
REV. 157, 177 (1977).
115. Wolston left unresolved a variety of questions concerning the "public contro-
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C. Elimination of the Involuntary Public Figure
By requiring purposeful and voluntary action for designation as a limited-issue public figure, the Court has eliminated
the category of an involuntary public figure."' The following
language from Gertz suggests that an individual might become a
public figure by being "drawn into" a public controversy: "More
commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn
into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues."117 The Court further
stated, "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own,
but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."' l8
Although the Court has never defined involuntary public
figures, Justice Brennan in his dissent in Firestone suggested
that they might include " 'individual[s] involved in or affected
by . . . official action.' "ll@W o h n , according to an amicus
brief, was precisely the sort of individual "involved in or affected
by . . . official action" who would qualify as an involuntary public figure under Gertz.lgo
Amici submit although the class of involuntary public
figures is limited, Petitioner is a member of that class. The inversy" requirement. Which public controversies involve sufficiently public issues to qualify as public controversies for defamation purposes? How much controversy must exist?
Will only a political controversy qualify? How prominent must the controversy be, e.g.,
must it involve national issues or will local disputes be acceptable in meeting the public
controversy requirement? In Hutchinson v. Prosmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), decided during the same term as Wokton, the Court held that public concern over wasteful government expenditures was not sufficient to meet the public controversy requirement. The
Court stated, "Respondents have not identified such a particular controversy; a t most,
they point to concern about general public expenditures. But that concern is shared by
most and relates to most public expenditures; it is not sufficient to make Hutchinson a
public figure." Id. at 135.
116. See Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making,
61 MINN.
L. REV.645, 681 (1977); Comment, Developing Standards of Care After Time,
Inc. v. Firestone: Experimentation Is Needed, 29 MERCER
L. REV.841,847-49 (1978); 46
TENN.
L. REV.252, 261 (1978). But see Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public
Interest, 30 STAN.L. REV.157, 170 (1977).
117. 418 US.at 351 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 345.
119. 424 US. at 476 n.4 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 62
(1971)).
120. Brief for Amici Curiae at 6, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979). The American Society of Newspaper Editors and the National Newspaper Association filed a joint brief as amici curiae.
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stant case does not involve activities of a personal or private
nature, wrongfully disclosed by government action. Rather, it
involves governmental activities in which Petitioner, either because of his status or activities, became enmeshed. Because of
congressional and grand jury investigations in the 1950's into
the activities and identities of Soviet agents in the United
States, the Petitioner was in the focus of the spotlight illuminating the most publicly discussed issue of the day. Indeed
even the extent to which the Congress and the Justice Department should have pursued their investigations and the methods they employed were, and remain today, hotly contested
topics.111

The Court's continued selection from Gertz of the more restrictive definition of a limited-issue public figure, which makes
no mention of the possibility of an involuntary public figure, argues for the elimination of that category. Moreover, since Wolston indicates that action that is not only voluntary but also
purposeful is now required to characterize limited-issue public
figures, it is theoretically impossible for the involuntary public
figure to exist. The Court in Wokton suggested this result when
it stated, "A private individual is not automatically transformed
into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated
with a matter that attracts public attention."lm
IV. CONCLUSION
In Wokiton, the Supreme Court refined its definition of a
public figure and consequently narrowed the class of individuals
capable of being designated "limited-issue" public figures in defamation actions.lmSIn the future, a limited-issue public figure
must have voluntarily entered a public controversy with the subjective intent of influencing the outcome. In other words purposeful as well as voluntary action is required. In addition, the
public controversy must be "legitimate," i.e., involve issues that
generate legitimate opposition or controversy within society as
subjectively determined by the court involved. In narrowing the
121. Id.
122. 443 U.S. at 167.
LAW389 (Supp. 1979). Of the seven post123. See G. GUNTHER,CONSTITUTIONAL
Firestone federal courts of appeals cases determined to involve plaintiffs meeting the
"limited issue" public figure definition, only Arnheiter v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d
804 (9th Cir. 1978), would qualify under Wokton's requirements of purposeful and voluntary action in a legitimate public controversy.
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class of persons capable of being designated limited-issue public
figures, the Court eliminated the possibility of involuntary limited-issue public figures. The practical effect of the decision in
Wolston will be to inhibit publication about activities of putative public figures where their subjective intent is not determinable and facts concerning them not absolutely verifiable.
Gordon R. Young

